By Joseph Daniel, ICC Fellow
In just a few weeks, the Assad regime in Syria has shifted from seemingly maintaining a firm grip on an indefinite status quo to becoming a relic of history. Former President Bashar al-Assad has fled the country; his government has been dismantled as various Syrian opposition forces carve out zones of control. The nation now stands at a crossroads, uncertain of what the future holds.
Nearly 50 years of Assad family rule — first under Hafez al-Assad and then for 24 years by his son, Bashar al-Assad — has come to an end. The regime’s legacy is marked by widespread repression, from the 1982 Hama massacre to war crimes during Syria’s occupation of Lebanon, the cultural oppression of the Kurdish minority, and more recently, atrocities against civilians during the 13-year Syrian war.
Since the Syrian revolution began in March 2011, sparked by the broader Arab Spring, the Assad regime has waged a brutal war against opposition forces. This conflict has claimed more than half a million lives, left hundreds of thousands missing, and displaced millions, leading to the world’s largest refugee crisis at the time.
With the fall of the Assad government, despite the uncertainty and challenges ahead, there are surreal moments of celebration and joy on the streets of Syria and among Syrians scattered across the globe. Emotionally moving stories of people who were imprisoned for decades in notorious facilities like Sednaya prison, now reunited with their families, are being shared with the world. There is a sense of justice as images emerge of government palaces — symbols of the extravagant wealth Syrians feel drained the country into poverty — being taken by rebel forces. The seizure of Captagon drug production facilities, which fueled Syria’s narco-state, is a relief to neighboring nations that have struggled to contain its devastating trade.
Talk of rebuilding Syria and lifting its poverty-stricken people toward economic stability fills many with hope for brighter days ahead. The streets are filled with celebration, marking the end of a struggle that began more than a decade ago. While the world has changed and the Middle East has moved on from the Arab Spring revolutions, Syria had descended into one of the 21st century’s worst tragedies. But that chapter of the “Syrian story” finally ended on Dec. 8, 2024.
Amid the celebrations, the sobering question of what comes next looms large. Words and promises of a better Syria for all Syrians hang in the air, but the reality is uncertain. Assad is gone, but who or what will replace him? There is little doubt that Syria’s next leadership will be vastly different from the Assad regime, but will it bring positive change or a worse fate? Despite his brutal dictatorship, disastrous governance, and the devastation of the country’s economy — which displaced half the population — Assad was seen by many, especially non-Sunni religious minorities, as a protector against the rise of extremist Sunni jihadist groups that gained strength during the war.
For these minorities, fear lingers alongside the surreal happiness. Their recent memories of sectarian violence fuel a deep anxiety, especially with the reality that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a powerful Islamist militant group, now controls much of the country, including the central capital of Damascus. The tension is palpable as Syrians face an uncertain future, unsure whether this new era will bring peace or further conflict.
Why did many of Syria’s religious minorities, especially Christians, view Assad as a protector? The Assad family belongs to the Alawites, a minority sect of Islam considered unorthodox by some Muslims, including jihadist groups. Although Syria is a Sunni-majority nation, it has been ruled by the Alawite Assad family since 1974. Their Ba’athist regime promoted a largely secular Arab nationalist governance. While Syrian law imposed restrictions on Muslim conversions and upheld Islamic-oriented family and personal status laws, as is common in many Muslim-majority nations, the Assad government sought to maintain a delicate religious balance. This helped suppress Sunni political-Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, that could threaten their rule.
The Assad regime’s broader strategy of secularizing the political system, primarily to secure its power, led to strict crackdowns on any political or religious movements that might destabilize Syria’s religious diversity. An indirect positive outcome of this approach was that religious minorities, including Christians, were shielded from radical Islamist groups that might target them — similar to what happened in Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s regime fell in the early 2000s.
As long as Syrian Christians adhered to state laws, avoided openly proselytizing Muslims, refrained from public criticism of the regime, and did not disrupt the political order, they were largely protected under Assad’s rule. This sense of protection, in contrast to the threat posed by non-state Islamist movements, is why many Christians viewed Assad as a safeguard against religious extremism.
During the Syrian Civil War (2011–2024), many Syrian Christians in major population centers like Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo preferred Assad’s government to rebel administrations. This was largely because rebel groups were dominated by extremist factions such as Al-Qaida’s affiliate Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamic State group (ISIS), and the Syrian National Army (SNA), all of which committed atrocities against Christians and other religious minorities in areas under their control. In places like Idlib, where HTS held power outside of Assad’s control for more than five years, the once-present Christian communities have been wiped out.
In the battles for Homs and Aleppo, Christians were specifically targeted — facing killings, property seizures, kidnappings, and other acts of terror. During the past three to four years, much of International Christian Concern’s (ICC) work in Syria has focused on helping Christians rebuild in cities like Aleppo and Homs, as well as in nearby Christian villages that suffered under HTS’s precursors. Given this contrast, the relative security provided by Assad’s regime, compared to the direct threat posed by extremist rebel groups like HTS, offered pragmatic reasons for Christians to prefer living in government-controlled areas rather than territories ruled by rebel forces.
Will Christians Be Persecuted in the ‘New Syria’?
Even with HTS forces taking control of Damascus, Syria remains divided into multiple zones, as it has been for several years. Christians, too, are not evenly distributed throughout the country. Most of Syria’s remaining Christians are concentrated in major cities like Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs, with smaller communities in villages west of Homs and Hama and northeastern cities such as Hasakeh and Qamishli. While exact numbers are difficult to estimate due to the instability of the last decade, it is believed that since the conflict began in 2011, Syria’s Christian population has declined by 70% to 80% from its pre-war levels. Conflict, displacement, terrorism, targeted persecution, and economic collapse contributed to this sharp decline. Syria’s Christian community is diverse, consisting of Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant denominations, along with a small number of informal house groups of converts from Muslim backgrounds.
So, what does the future hold for Syria’s remaining Christian community amid this sudden political shift? While the future is deeply uncertain, two key predictors offer insight: first, the words and assurances of the new ruling powers, and second, and perhaps most importantly, the past actions and attitudes of these groups toward Christians in the evolving landscape of the “New Syria.”
HTS and Christians in Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus
Most of Syria’s Christians live in the country’s three largest cities — Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs — while smaller communities reside in surrounding villages. Since 2016, these cities have been under Assad’s control, but in a swift offensive in late November and December 2024, they fell to the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The future of Christians under HTS’s transitional government is uncertain, as their current rhetoric contrasts sharply with their past actions. HTS, formerly known as Al-Nusra Front and once an offshoot of Al-Qaida until they split in 2016, had a history of persecuting Christians in areas they controlled.
However, HTS now claims to aim for a peaceful transition that promises security, prosperity, and inclusion for all Syrians, including minorities such as Christians, Alawites, and Druze. Their public message stresses goodwill and invites all Syrians to participate in rebuilding a unified country, provided they are committed to moving past the decade-long conflict.
Two key questions remain, with answers only time will reveal. First, are HTS’s promises sincere, and will they translate into actual policies that protect minorities, despite internal sectarian divisions? Or is this merely a public relations effort aimed at rebranding the group and gaining international legitimacy while retaining their earlier al-Qaida-era treatment of Christians? The second question is whether Syria’s fractured rebel groups will unite under a cohesive government with a redrafted constitution that guarantees minority rights, national reconstruction, and peace — or if the country will remain divided into competing zones of control, leaving vulnerable minorities like Christians caught in the crossfire. The already dwindling Christian population could shrink even further if the latter occurs.
Turkey and the SNA in North Syria
Another critical question is the continued role of Turkey in the “New Syria.” Turkey’s primary ally in recent years has been the Syrian National Army (SNA). Since the Arab Spring in 2011, Turkey has opposed the Assad regime, supported various rebel groups, and, since 2016, focused on dislodging Kurdish forces in northern Syria. While Turkey has supported HTS, they have not been the primary proxy; the alliance was based on a shared enemy in Assad.
After Assad’s fall, Turkey remains the closest dominant regional power to the new HTS government. It has quickly moved to strengthen its support of HTS in Damascus, much like it did in Idlib province during the war. Additionally, Turkey has mobilized its SNA allies to attack the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in northeastern Syria. The SNA has faced accusations of ethnic cleansing and attacks against Christians, Yazidis, and other cultural sites in the areas they’ve controlled during the conflict.
Turkey’s influence in shaping the future of Syria’s government will be crucial in the coming years, particularly concerning religious freedoms and the kind of Islamist system HTS will implement. The direction Turkey takes in its dealings with the new Syrian government could significantly influence Syria’s political and religious landscape.
SDF and Christians in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continue to control roughly one-third of Syria’s territory in the north and east. Led by a Kurdish self-administration, which formed as an effective fighting force against ISIS, the SDF has received military support from the U.S., including weapons, training, and the presence of U.S. military bases in Syria for counter-terrorism operations. The SDF has expressed interest in negotiating reintegration into a new Syrian government but under specific conditions and guarantees.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which governs this territory, has positioned itself as a model of coexistence among Syria’s diverse ethnic and religious communities. While their record is not flawless, the AANES has acted as a bulwark against attacks on Christian villages by the Syrian National Army (SNA) and ISIS during the civil war.
Although many Christians have fled their historic communities in cities like Qamishli, Raqqa, and Hasakeh, a small number remain, hopeful that their protection will continue under the SDF or any future political settlement in Syria. Recently, Turkey has taken advantage of the shifting geopolitical situation in Syria to escalate its attacks on Kurdish forces in the north, accusing them of ties to the PKK, a Kurdish militant group Turkey has battled for almost four decades.
The work accomplished by the AANES in recent years, particularly after the defeat of ISIS in Syria, is remarkable, given their internal and external challenges. Their efforts to build a functioning administration and promote peace among diverse ethnic and religious groups must be acknowledged and strengthened in Syria’s future. If the new Syrian leadership is serious about respecting minorities, they should look to the AANES as a model and work toward peacefully integrating them into a united Syria, rather than allowing external powers like Turkey to disrupt that process with attacks.
This is an area where the United States has a direct role to play in post-Assad Syria. The U.S. must broker peace between the SDF, its counter-ISIS allies, and NATO ally Turkey. Supporting and protecting proven voices of religious coexistence during the Syrian crisis — such as the AANES — is crucial for promoting religious liberty in Syria. The U.S. should prioritize long-term solutions that protect religious freedoms, rather than short-term promises from parties that have not demonstrated a consistent commitment to respecting those freedoms.
What’s Next?
Substantial change in Syria will undoubtedly take several years, likely well after the headlines surrounding the country have faded. It may take years before elections can occur and rebel groups are transformed into functioning state institutions. After 13 years of crisis, Syria will require an even longer time to rebuild. There are several key issues to watch in the coming months that will shape Syria’s religious freedom landscape and determine whether Syria’s Christians will face further persecution or enjoy gradual improvements in their religious liberties.
First, the rhetoric and actions of Al-Julani and the HTS group remain a significant question mark. So far, their rhetoric suggests a commitment to protecting minorities; however, given the ongoing instability, there is a risk that other militant groups could exploit the power vacuum, potentially targeting minorities like Christians, as seen in Iraq following the U.S.-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein in the early 2000s.
A second issue to monitor is the conflict in northeastern Syria, where Turkish forces and the SNA continue to attack Kurdish forces. If Syria and international players genuinely seek a more tolerant and open future, it is crucial to act now to de-escalate the situation in the north. The AANES must be given a seat at the negotiation table to help rewrite Syria’s constitution and form a new, inclusive administration.
The third issue is displacement and the potential for return. The initial news of Assad’s downfall sparked global excitement among Syria’s millions of displaced people, both internally and abroad, with hopes of returning home running high. Many Christians left during the offensive against Assad, while others are still waiting for a chance to leave. The majority of Syria’s Christian population had already fled during the crisis. Whether any of them will return largely depends on Syria’s ability to stabilize or whether the country will slip back into further crisis, where Christians could again become targets for their faith.
Finally, the decline in Syria’s Christian population has continued for more than a decade. The nation’s economic collapse, targeted attacks during the war, and the current fear of a lack of state protection from terrorist organizations leave many Christians fearful of staying. Some courageous Christians may remain by choice, while others may have no option but to stay. For Christian converts from a Muslim background, the challenges are likely to persist. It is unlikely that Syria’s Christians will have much of a direct voice in the formation of a new government. However, their ability to influence society through their long-established peaceful, social, and charitable efforts should not be underestimated. Even as a small and dwindling minority, their contributions remain vital in shaping Syria’s future.
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