It’s a label the leaders of Israel and Hamas would likely reject. But Hamas commander Yehia Sinwar and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, already bitter rivals, have become something else as well: allies.
Whatever arrangement emerges for governing a postwar Gaza, one consensus assumption has emerged for Israel as well Washington and key Arab Gulf states: Mr. Sinwar’s Hamas would no longer be in charge.
Why We Wrote This
War can create uncomfortable common ground between opponents. In Gaza, political interests of the leaders of Israel and Hamas may be helping to extend the conflict despite negotiators’ urgent efforts.
Meanwhile, Mr. Netanyahu confronts the aftermath of a cataclysmic attack that his security forces failed to anticipate and to which the military responded only slowly.
Yet both men have every reason to feel they’ve been gaining politically from the war. Hamas has survived the full force of Israel’s military. Mr. Netanyahu’s single-minded focus, batting aside international criticism, has kept most Israelis on board.
For mediators increasingly desperate to get a cease-fire, there’s recognition they may need to tailor any agreement in such a way both leaders feel they can present as a political victory. The United States and its allies recognize that the alternative – further fighting and suffering, and very likely deaths for both Palestinians and the Gaza hostages – will make that goal even more difficult.
Hamas commander Yehia Sinwar and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who are driving the war in Gaza, are bitter rivals. Yet amid the deadlocked international efforts to secure a cease-fire, these two men have become something else as well.
Allies.
While they would doubtless reject that label, it is clear to the would-be mediators that both men share compelling personal and political reasons to want to stave off a negotiated end to the conflict.
Why We Wrote This
War can create uncomfortable common ground between opponents. In Gaza, political interests of the leaders of Israel and Hamas may be helping to extend the conflict despite negotiators’ urgent efforts.
And that presents a formidable challenge for U.S. and Arab diplomats straining to halt the fighting and relieve a mounting humanitarian crisis, both for hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians in Gaza and for the dozens of Israeli hostages Hamas still holds.
Both leaders know a moment of reckoning awaits when the fighting is over, and that they might well not survive it politically. For Mr. Sinwar, the stakes are even higher: not just power, but potentially his life.
Hamas calculations
The Hamas leader provoked the war. Last Oct. 7, his units swarmed across the border, beating, abducting, and killing more than a thousand civilians. The Israeli response, which he surely anticipated, was a declaration of war, a vow to dismantle Hamas’ hold on Gaza and to target Mr. Sinwar and other Hamas commanders.
And whatever arrangement emerges for governing Gaza when the war finally ends, one consensus assumption, not just for Israel but also for Washington and key Arab Gulf states, has emerged: Hamas would no longer be in charge.
Mr. Netanyahu, meanwhile, is also keen to avoid a political reckoning.
Israel’s “Mr. Security”
The country’s longest-serving prime minister, he has built his career on an image of strength, as Israel’s “Mr. Security.”
Yet he was at the helm on Oct. 7, the most deadly attack on Jewish civilians since the Holocaust – an attack his security forces failed to anticipate, and that the military not only failed to prevent, but also proved agonizingly slow in confronting.
A hefty majority of Israelis have told pollsters they hold him politically responsible.
Mr. Netanyahu has so far fended off all calls to acknowledge responsibility. Instead, while saying there will clearly be questions for all involved to answer, he’s insisted that accountability must wait until the war is over.
The challenge facing international efforts to secure a cease-fire is not just the rival leaders’ clear reluctance to facilitate such a deal.
Calculating gains
It is that both men have every reason to feel they’ve been gaining politically from the war.
Mr. Sinwar will feel Hamas has triumphed simply by surviving the full force of Israel’s military. In fact, his forces have begun to regroup in areas of northern Gaza that, a few months ago, Israel had declared cleared of Hamas fighters.
As for the price paid by Gaza’s civilians – well over 30,000 dead, and devastating property and infrastructure damage – the Hamas line is that this is Israel’s doing. Caring for the hundreds of thousands of people displaced, wounded, or hungry is the responsibility of aid organizations.
Mr. Sinwar has also watched as the deepening humanitarian crisis and Israel’s determination to do irrevocable damage to Hamas’ power have caused an unprecedented strain in Israel’s ties with international allies – including its most important, the United States.
Yet Mr. Netanyahu has gained as well, and not just by deferring any political reckoning.
His single-minded focus on the war, and on batting aside international criticism of the way it’s being waged, has so far kept most Israelis on board. He’s actually seen his polling numbers rebound somewhat from their nosedive after Oct. 7.
And critically, he’s been able to retain his parliamentary majority, which relies on a pair of far-right, overtly anti-Arab parties that want even more force used in Gaza.
What about a cease-fire?
All of that has brought a mounting frustration, and a deeper sense of urgency, about getting a cease-fire and a release of hostages in exchange for the freeing of Palestinians in Israeli jails.
The hope is that a mixture of carrot and stick can yet unblock the Israeli and Hamas leaders’ resistance.
Shannon Stapleton/Reuters
The stick? Political pressure, mostly from Washington on Israel, and from key Arab states on Hamas.
So far, that’s not worked.
But in Israel, pressure on Mr. Netanyahu has been growing from the families, friends, and supporters of the hostages. There have also been leaked reports of frustration among top military officers about his failure to set out a coherent and achievable end goal for the war. Those feelings could gather further strength, given the army’s need to go back into parts of Gaza it had attacked and cleared of Hamas forces months earlier in the war.
Still, there’s a recognition that some form of a carrot may also be needed: a way to tailor any agreement in such a way both leaders feel they can present as a political victory.
A tall order? Yes.
But the U.S. and its allies recognize that the alternative – further fighting, further suffering, and very likely deaths for both Palestinians and the Gaza hostages – will make the ultimate goal of negotiating an end to the war even more difficult.
