(RNS) — Lawmakers in Estonia’s Parliament are debating a draft bill that would effectively require the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian Orthodox Church’s presence in the country, to cut ties with Moscow and its Patriarch Kirill or face liquidation by the government.
While government proponents argue the move would prevent the spread of extremism as it relates to Russian ideology and propaganda in the country, church leaders and other critics say accusations are unfounded and could worsen tensions between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians in Estonia.
“As a state, we respect religious freedom and continue to have no intention of lightly interfering in the activities of churches and congregations,” Estonia’s Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets said in a Jan. 23 statement, “but in the changed security environment, we must ensure the possibilities to limit the spread of extremist ideologies through religious associations both today and in the future.”
The Estonian Ministry of the Interior’s religious affairs adviser, Ringo Ringvee, told Estonian media he hoped the Parliament would act by summer.
The bill mirrors a law passed in Ukraine last year, and similar bills popping up around eastern Europe, rewriting Orthodox Christianity’s canonical borders in Europe. The Russian church has been accused of proliferating the ideology of “Rússkiy mir” or “Russian World” under which President Vladimir Putin has justified Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Kirill has declared Russian Orthodoxy a fundamental pillar of the Russian World ideology, calling the country’s invasion of Ukraine a “holy war” in April 2024, and giving spiritual justifications to the conflict.
Leaders of the church in Estonia, known as MPEOK, however, pushed back against the claims in a statement Tuesday (Feb. 18).
“We have always held and continue to hold an anti-war position, which we have repeatedly confirmed publicly. Thus, we confirm that the claims that our Church poses a threat to national security are completely unfounded,” the statement signed by the ranking leaders of the church said.
“Although in the canonical sense we are an autonomous part of the Moscow Patriarchate, this concerns exclusively canonical and Eucharistic unity, and does not mean practical management and administration of our Church by political or governmental circles of a foreign state,” the statement added. “Our Church is completely independent in its daily activities, economic decisions and management of parishes. All our decisions are made by the governing bodies of the Estonian Church – the Council and the Synod, guided by canon law and the laws of the Republic of Estonia, and taking into account the needs of local parishes.”
In the Baltics, Catholicism (Lithuania) and Lutheranism (Estonia and Latvia) had historically been the largest Christian denominations, while Orthodoxy has largely been restricted to ethnic Russians who moved to the area during the Russian Imperial (1710 to 1917) and Soviet periods (1940 to 1991). Nonetheless, the rapid secularization of ethnic Estonians during the Soviet period and after independence has made the Orthodox church the largest single Christian denomination in Estonia, even though it only represents around 9% of the population.
Russian Orthodox clergy have been accused of using their pulpits to spread propaganda, advance the aims of the Russian state and of working for Russia’s intelligence service, the FSB. In October 2023, the Russian Orthodox Church’s leading cleric in Bulgaria was expelled from the country on accusations of espionage, and the FBI has also warned Orthodox communities in the United States that Russian intelligence may use the church to target them.
Last year, Estonia also expelled the Metropolitan of Tallinn and All Estonia, Metropolitan Yevgeniy, the head of the Moscow-oriented church, considering him to be a security risk.
An October poll found that while 59% of Estonians overall supported the idea behind the bill, that number rose to 75% among ethnic Estonians and fell to just 25% among other ethnic groups in Estonia, the largest of whom are Russians.
“The Estonian State cannot accept a situation where because of the affiliation of the Estonian Orthodox Church with the Moscow Patriarchate, dozens of churches and tens of thousands of Orthodox believers are forced to recognize a former KGB agent as their highest spiritual authority,” Läänemets said in a parliamentary speech in November, referring to Kirill.
Critics of the bill have argued that in addition to overturning centuries of church tradition, separating Estonia’s Orthodox churches from Moscow would be seen as persecution of ethnic Russians in the country, Anastassija Tido, an Estonian journalist who has been covering the situation, told RNS.
“For the local ethnic Russians, Orthodoxy is often not about faith. At least for the majority, it is not a matter of belief, it remains a fragment of identity that they have held onto,” Tido said. “Russians living abroad face a deep identity crisis. They do not know how to define themselves — they are neither fully tied to Russia nor entirely to Estonia.”
That identity crisis has been further complicated by Estonia’s citizenship laws. When Estonia declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, it only recognized as citizens those people who had been citizens of the interwar Estonian state and their descendants, who are mostly ethnic Estonians.
However, during nearly 50 years of Soviet rule, hundreds of thousands of Russian speakers moved into the Baltics, including Estonia. Upon independence, they along with their children and grandchildren born in Estonia, did not receive the automatic citizenship, despite accounting for over 30% of the population.
To acquire citizenship, they were required to pass a test on the Estonian Constitution and prove proficiency in the Estonian language, for which the government provided funding for lessons.
Over the years, many would acquire that citizenship. By 2007, Estonia’s stateless population dropped from 32% to 8%, and to 6% in 2020, when Estonia passed a new law giving automatic citizenship to children of stateless parents who had resided in Estonia for at least five years.
According to a 2016 report by the German-based European Centre for Minority Issues, socioeconomic divides also exist in Estonia, with Russian speakers having a weaker average socioeconomic status and higher rates of poverty, incarceration, homelessness, trafficking victimization, drug abuse and HIV/AIDS.
Moreover, a 2022 law decreed that by 2030, Estonian would be the sole language of education in the country. Estonian leaders have argued the education reform will tear down linguistic barriers for children entering the labor market, while many in the ethnic Russian community have decried it as an act of forced assimilation.
MPEOK leaders have reacted similarly to the current bill, regarding it as an attack on Russian identity in Estonia.
“Although the government justifies the legislative changes with the security situation, this is direct interference in religious freedom, which could significantly restrict our Church’s activities in Estonia,” said Bishop Daniel of Tartu, a leader of the MPEOK, in a January statement.
In a strongly worded letter to the Estonian Parliament, Abbess Filareta, the leader of the Pühtitsa Convent — a historic Russian Orthodox monastic community in eastern Estonia — accused backers of the bill of punishing the church for the actions of politicians and trying to strong-arm internal church politics. She also said she believed the bill’s purpose was to compel MPEOK to “come under the auspices” of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church, a parallel Orthodox body in Estonia.
“We have withdrawn from worldly life; we are far removed from political concerns, leading our lives outside of politics, serving God through prayer and labour,” she said. “Yet, we are being dragged into political disputes and accused of refusing to engage in dialogue.”
